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Why is the Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial
Organization (JAFIO) publishing a special issue titled,
The Behavioral and Neuroeconomics of Food and Brand
Decisions?” Industrial organization examines the struc-
ture of firms and markets, especially how firms interact
with each other. JAFIO readers are familiar with how
firms in food and agriculture markets interact, the
methods by which they seek to change the competitive
structure, and how that structure is impacted by
changes to the marketplace from without (e.g. regula-
tion, trade, protests) and within (e.g. prices, differentia-
tion, advertising). Quite often those market changes
come about through physical alteration of a product
or the perceptual alteration through labeling or brand-
ing. The food industrial organization literature devotes
a great deal of research on the impacts of brands and
labels, along with myriad other product differentiation
strategies. JAFIO frequently publishes articles on food
decision making under product differentiation; covering
issues of branding, advertising, warranties, labeling
and food safety. Cutting edge economic theory and
empirical methods are, likewise, common to JAFIO. As
such, it is important to bring researchers who work on
food industrial organization the latest techniques and
findings that can be put to use in this arena. Advances
in technology and experimental methods from neu-
roscience and psychological science are quickly chan-
ging our understanding of how humans perceive food
choices. Because of that, now is a good time for econ-
omists who work on food industry structure and,
especially, food and food attribute signals, to become
more aware of those advances.
Consider two of the workhorses of product choice
modeling: the random utility model (McFadden 1974) and
its theoretical counterpart in models of product differentia-
tion, the Mussa-Rosen model (Mussa and Rosen 1978). We
know the general formulations of these models as begin-
ning with an index function where individual i has an
indirect utility for good j written as Vij = xij′ βij − αjpj + εij.
Here xij represents the product or in the case of a vector,
the product attributes (e.g. sweetness, healthfulness, eco-
friendliness) that individual i either knows or perceives to
be in good j and/or the individual’s characteristics (e.g.
income, education, health) that influences i’s choice of
product j. The product attributes can be experience attri-
butes or credence attributes. The price of good j is pj and βij
represents the marginal utility for attribute j, here denoted
with a subscript i as marginal utility specific to the indivi-
dual, but could be representative of the product attribute
alone (βij = βj) and/or as a draw from some probability
distribution reflecting consumers’ preferences as it usually
is in Mussa-Rosen applications. The price multiplier, αj, is
commonly reflective of an index in theoretical applications
and quite often set to 1 whereas in empirical applications it
is an estimated parameter. Finally the error term, εij,
reflects idiosyncratic factors specific to an individual, but
unobservable to the analyst. The error term usually repre-
sents random consumer errors: an “oops” term.
The starting point for the estimation of the random
utility model (RUM) or the Mussa-Rosen analysis begins
with considerations of the form, “Consumer i prefers j to k
whenever Vij >Vik.” In the RUM, this inequality, along with
axioms of error independence and the imposition of an
appropriate distribution, sets up the formulation of the
multinomial logit model that has been used in multitudes
of papers. The largest benefit of the RUM comes about
through the interpretation of willingness to pay (WTP) as
the corresponding slope of an indifference curve whereby
WTP = − βij=αj. Similarly, in the Mussa-Rosen analyses,
axioms of the properties of the marginal utilities and
assumptions about market competition (e.g. Cournot,
Bertrand) lead to market models where firms select attri-
butes to affect the ultimate distribution of consumer prefer-
ences and, hence, market shares. For example, the single
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attribute, 2-firm, Bertrand model where βj = βk = β is distrib-
uted uniformly over a unit interval yields the indifferent
consumer appearing at point β= ½pj − pk=½xj − xk 2 ½0, 1,
so that price and attribute differences affect market share
in a logical manner: higher prices lower a firm’s share and
greater differentiation ameliorates competition.
Neuroscience, psychology, and behavioral economics
reveal that much of the conventional wisdom underlying
these common models of product choice is not so con-
ventional. For example, the marginal utility often taken
as simply an unobservable datum, might actually be
observable, or at least partially so. Levy and Glimcher
(2012) argue that one can begin to see in scans of the
brain during consumer choices, something akin to a
“neural currency” that correlates positively with the sub-
ject’s stated valuation of objects. Other research claims to
have discovered “subjective value” calculated in the pre-
frontal region of the brain when subjects are asked to
make food choices that are of economic value (Hare et al.
2011; Bartra et al. 2013). Revealed preferences that once
were asserted to emerge from a “black box” of utility
theory appear to be more observable than once believed.
Webb et al. (2013) have proposed a neural random utility.
It may soon be possible to elicit WTP for a product free of
genetically modified ingredients not from surveys and
experimental shopping trips, but from direct observations
of βij and αj through a brain scan. This should prove
especially useful in contingent valuation studies in
which the “good,” does not actually exist. How does
one put a price on a clean beach? Examining the brain
may one day tell us, as Smith et al. (2014) discuss in their
aptly titled, “Neural Activity Reveals Preferences without
Choices.”
We are also learning that many factors impact the
underlying parameters of the above models. This was
always suspected if not known, but psychological
research is demonstrating that the parameters are
impacted in ways that may necessarily alter axioms of
the models. In the two simple cases presented above,
what happens when ceteris paribus cannot be assumed
away as it is when assuming that price is not an attribute
with its own marginal utility? What happens if the
demand curve is shaped like an “S”? By this, we do not
mean the S-shape proposed by R.G.D. Allen in his
famous 1938 tome (p. 113) where demand increases
slowly initially as price drops and declines quickly as
price nears zero. Rather, consider demand as a true S-
shape where very low prices further lower one’s WTP
such that quantity demanded actually falls and very
high prices raise WTP so that above some high price,
quantity demand begins to increase? For example (the
following cases are discussed in this special issue by
Enax and Weber), what if a higher price of wine causes
you to believe that the wine is higher quality? By
“believe”, we mean that the higher price actually causes
changes in your brain that makes the wine a higher
quality to your tastes? Likewise, a lower price makes
the wine actually taste worse. Price is no longer a signal.
It is an attribute. The implication is that demand is
no longer a one-to-one function. Empirically, this may
prove more annoyance than issue. Axiomatically, how-
ever, an S-shaped “demand” function cannot be derived
from a quasi-concave utility function. WTP as con-
structed above, demands quasi-concavity. Take another
example. Economists view nutrition labels as providing
information, and economists are interested in the benefit
of that information. But research suggests that such
labels actually change the brain’s response to the taste
and satiation of the labeled product. How do researchers
using traditional WTP analysis control for such an effect?
And finally, what about that unsung error term? The
assumption that mistakes are random or mostly random,
that they dissipate over repeated purchases and that they
have a mean of zero are common throughout the indus-
trial organization and consumer decisions literature.
What the research in this issue will show is that there
are dynamic feedback effects that impact choices, even
choices only seconds apart, in ways that are not as
straightforward as a simple “assume a mean zero” hand
waving would allow. The decision a consumer made a
split second ago can alter the decision process she makes
for her next choice. This may give researchers pause, but
it may also prove to be a source for future advances in
understanding decision making. For example, preference
reversals (Tversky and Thaler 1990) and transitivity viola-
tions (Loomes et al. 1991) in experimental settings are
examples of axiomatic problems with utility. However,
greater understanding of the actual decision process in
human brains might reveal that, from the perspective of
the person making the decision, preferences do not
reverse and transitivity is not violated, the decision is
completely rational.
Utility, of course, is a theoretical construct: a stand-in
for the actual decision-making process. Are the techni-
ques and technology at the point where something akin
to a utility function can actually be found in the human
brain? No. In fact, that likely may never happen. But, the
research is intriguing, the technology is improving, and
the appeal of advancing our understanding is limitless.
To economists interested in food decisions, progress seen
in other fields ought to be exciting. In the articles for this
special issue, we gathered information from a wide range
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of research related to food decisions from behavioral
economics, psychology, and neuroscience. The articles,
we hope, will provide a useful reference to researchers
examining these techniques for the first time.
The paper, “Cognitive Neuroscience Perspectives on
Food Decision-Making: A Brief Introduction” by Lepping
et al. begins our presentation for this special issue. Lepping
et al. provide a broad overview of techniques used to expand
our understanding of the process of decision making. In the
past several decades, technology has afforded the ability to
examine the decision process from a more precise, neuro-
physiological basis. Authors discuss functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG),
and magnetoencephalography (MEG). They provide some
examples of studies that have examined food decision-mak-
ing, and then more specifically, studies that have examined
the neural responses to advertising and/or branding. Results
from these studies have direct application to product packa-
ging, marketing, and certain policies on advertising to chil-
dren. The authors conclude with a plea for cross-discipline
collaboration, including cognitive neuroscientists, econo-
mists, policy-makers, and agricultural scientists.
Another overview of techniques and literature is pre-
sented in “Marketing Placebo Effects – From Behavioral
Effects to Behavior Change?” by Enax and Weber. This
article is especially fascinating for industrial organization
researchers who study credence labels such as health
claims and eco-labeling, claims that cannot be easily
discerned by the consumer. Enax and Webber focus espe-
cially on how labels, brands, advertisements and logos
can act like a placebo effect in medical studies. The
information can actually lead to changes in the brain so
that the consumer really does experience the product
differently depending on how the label is presented.
Enax and Weber also include discussion of the impact
on children as many of the regulatory proposals for label-
ing and advertising impact children.
In “The Role of Knowledge in Choice, Valuation, and
Outcomes for Multi-attribute Goods,” Gustafson investi-
gates the impact of product knowledge on decision
making in the context of quality-differentiated wine.
After a literature review and a discussion of three prior
experimental studies, the author concludes that more
knowledgeable consumers make greater use of objective
information available to them when making decisions.
Decision making quality is also related to knowledge, as
more knowledgeable consumers are more likely to make
use of objective information to update their valuations. In
addition, more knowledgeable consumers are more likely
to value options drawn from large choice sets than are
less knowledgeable consumers. The results highlight the
importance of experience and knowledge in explaining
how consumers respond to information and food labels.
In “Brands and Food-Related decision Making: How
Does Food Branding Affect Consumer Choice, Preference,
and Intake? A Systematic Review of Recent Findings,”
Boyland and Christiansen review the literature on the
effect of brands on food choice. The authors find little
commonality across the ten papers they reviewed in
terms of the effect of presence of brands and food intake
or choice. They argue that more work is needed on the
subject, especially in light of the argument that promo-
tion of unhealthy, branded food is partially to blame for
obesity and dietary-related disease.
Eye tracking studies are likely new to many readers of
this journal. Indeed, economists generally seem uncon-
cerned about the decision process itself whereas eye track-
ing studies try to expose the process. This issue has two
eye-tracking studies. In “Modeling Eye Movements and
Response Times in Consumer Choice,” Krajbich and Smith
provide a detailed guide on eye-tracking methods and the
rationale for how they reveal consumer preferences and the
relationship between decision time and eventual choice. It is
easy to think of choices as if homo economicuswalks around
with a set of stored preferences and upon encountering an
affordable choice set makes her decision based upon these
preferences. Eye tracking studies have shown this not to be
the case even for goods that are well known to the consu-
mer. The studies have revealed some rather surprising
regularities such as, one actually takes longer choosing
between goods for which one is indifferent. Why wouldn’t
such a choice be automatic? The process itself is dynamic.
In “Visual Attention and Choice: A Behavioral
Economics Perspective on Food Decisions,” Grebitus et al.,
utilize eye tracking methods to study how consumers
decide in choice experiments that utilize different designs.
The authors conducted two choice experiments that varied
in complexity. One choice experiment included products
where only three attributes varied and another choice
experiment used products varied according to five attri-
butes. The authors find that the more information on a
product (i.e., five rather than three attributes) the more
time respondents spend looking at the product, although
less attention tends to be spent on a single piece of informa-
tion. In the three-attribute design, the authors find that the
longer an individual looks at non-price attributes, the more
important is the attribute in determining choice. However,
dwell time is largely uncorrelated with choice in the five-
attribute design. The authors demonstrate the use of eye
tracking as a tool to help guide choice experiment design.
In “Towards Alternative Ways to Measure Attitudes
Related to Consumption,” Koller and Walla take a
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heuristic approach to presenting studies of human beha-
vioral response by beginning their discussion with the
most basic of questions from “Why do many consumers
love to eat sweets or other treats rich in calories on a
regular basis although they know they shouldn’t?” to
“Why do we have a head with a brain in it where cogni-
tions and emotions interplay?” After discussing several
experimental models, they present the importance of the
startle-reflex paradigm in models of consumer choice.
Startle paradigms are useful in attempts to discern the
degree of emotion and motivation in a decision.
In “I Can’t Wait: Methods for Measuring andModerating
Individual Differences in Impulsive Choice,” Peterson and
colleagues discuss proposed mechanisms of delay discount-
ing in both animal models and humans. They define delay
discounting, then describe tasks of impulsive choice used in
the laboratory and in human testing sessions. They go on to
explain four mechanisms of impulsive choice, including
timing, reward processing, motivation/industriousness,
and working memory. The authors use obesity as a clinical
example of impulsive choices. The paper ends with a hope-
ful note about the potential of behavioral interventions to
significantly improve underlying mechanisms which would
ultimately improve delay discounting.
How humans make decisions between choices today
and choices in the future has been an important aspect of
economic research. Much discussion revolves the impact
if consumers have so-called hyperbolic discounting
where discount rates change over time. How discounting
impacts food choices is a budding area of research. In
“A Cup Today or a Pot Later: On the Discounting of
Delayed Caffeinated Beverages,” Jarmolowicz and collea-
gues examine delay discounting using caffeinated bev-
erages. The authors administered a standard monetary
discounting questionnaire (e.g. $100 today versus $150
in one month), but also developed a new questionnaire
that requires people to make decisions about caffeinated
beverages (e.g. 5 cups of coffee today versus 15 cups of
coffee in one week). The caffeine questionnaire was tai-
lored to each person according to how much monetary
value s/he placed on one caffeinated beverage. They
recruited both habitual (daily) caffeine consumers and
occasional caffeine consumers. Caffeine beverages were
shown to be discounted at a higher rate than monetary
rewards for the occasional users. Then the authors made
a direct comparison between habitual (daily) caffeine
consumers and occasional caffeine consumers. Unlike
results from other substance users (i.e. cocaine, tobacco),
the daily consumers did not discount caffeine more
rapidly than the occasional users. Overall, the study
adds another unique commodity to the growing list
examined in light of the construct of delay discounting.
The final paper is an fMRI study with an information
intervention. In “Are Consumers as Constrained as Hens
are Confined? Brain Activations and Behavioral Choices
after Informational Influence,” Francisco et al. examined
the behavioral and brain effects from videos relating to the
confinement of egg laying hens. Participants made choices
between eggs based on price, on living conditions of the
hens, or where they needed to pay a premium for the more
“humane” option. Three separate videos were shown: one
promoting restrictions on small confinement, one against
restrictions, and a neutral video. Results showed that par-
ticipants in the “pro” video showed brain changes in a
region associated with social risk after watching the video.
Overall, this shows the significant influence of information
on not only behavior, but on the brain as well.
The variety of papers in this special issue of JAFIO
should provide readers with a broad introduction to
newer methodological approaches to understanding
food choices and human decision-making.
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